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Abstract 
   
In this paper, we investigate efficiency differences between income and in-kind transfers as 
distribution mechanisms of foreign aid to weakest-link international public goods in a laboratory 
environment. We find that if there is relatively small difference in country size, then income 
transfers seem to provide a higher provision of the international public good, and thus higher 
overall welfare level than that of in-kind transfers. However, if there is a large disparity in 
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been a renewed interest in foreign aid, particularly over the past few years, as a 
means to help poor countries finance international public goods (IPG), i.e. goods that provide 
benefits which have transnational reach. According to the World Bank (2001), the percentage of 
total official development assistance that was spent on IPGs rose from 1.5 percent in the 1970s to 
almost 8 percent in 1999. In the second half of the 1990s, developed countries transferred 
approximately $2 billion a year to finance the core IPG’s activities such as contagious disease 
control, biodiversity protection, and peacekeeping in the developing world. 
Public good aid generally takes the form of either income transfers or in-kind transfers. A 
typical example of an in-kind transfer is the 2003 dispatch of medical teams by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention to help control the outbreak of SARS in Asia. The effectiveness 
of foreign aid to an IPG is largely dependent upon the aggregation technology of the public good. 
For instance, when the aggregation technology is best shot—the provision level of an IPG is 
determined by the largest individual effort—it may be in developed countries’ best interest to 
assume the leading role in providing the optimal level of such IPGs and limit resources 
transferred to developing countries. Examples of best-shot IPGs are the efforts devoted towards a 
research breakthrough for a cure of cancer, an infectious disease, etc…. On the contrary, when 
the provision of an IPG is determined by the smallest individual contribution, the so-called 
weakest-link technology, there are greater incentives for the rich to assist the poor so as to boost 
the provision of an IPG. Fighting against international terrorism and eradicating contagious 
diseases such as AIDS are examples of weakest-link IPGs. Without foreign aid, the success of 
preventing, say, AIDS from further spreading around the world would be constrained not only by 
the limited resources available in countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, and Thailand to finance 
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programs that fight the deadly disease, but also by their capacities to implement these programs. 
Clearly, the effectiveness of fighting AIDS under such a circumstance would not be satisfactory. 
Thus, to win the worldwide combat against AIDS and ensure the health of their own citizens, 
rich countries such as the U.S., U.K., and Japan have a good incentive to assist the poor.1 As 
noted by Vicary (1990), foreign transfers used to finance weakest-link public goods under certain 
circumstances “involve no altruism on the part of donors, and are made simply to maximize 
donors’ utilities.” 
 Acknowledging the importance of foreign aid in augmenting the provision of weakest-
link IPGs, we focus our investigation on the effectiveness of foreign aid when the aggregation 
technology of a public good takes the form of weakest-link. More specifically, we are interested 
in the effectiveness of the two transfer schemes—income vs. in-kind transfers—in providing 
weakest-link IPGs and improving global welfare. There have been a few theoretical studies on 
this topic. Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999) show that there exists a condition under which both 
countries are better off by a resource transfer from the rich to the poor, and that the neutrality 
theorem (Warr, 1983) holds in a post-transfer equilibrium, i.e. the donor and the recipient are 
indifferent between aid in the form of income or in-kind transfers.2  The neutrality theorem is 
satisfied regardless of whether the game is organized in a simultaneous-contribution framework 
or a leader-follower setup. Vicary and Sandler (2002) show that in a two-stage two-country game 
where agents decide cash transfers in the first stage and contributions to the public goods to 
either country in the second stage, income transfers may be Pareto superior to in-kind transfers 
when two countries are equally efficient in producing the public goods. 
                                                 
1 According to OECD (2004), the U.S. was the largest bilateral donor in the combat of fighting HIV/AIDS with 
contributions around $793 million per year (2000-2002). It is followed by the U.K. ($337 million) and Japan ($161 
million). 
2 In their model, two countries share the same preferences but differ in their endowments. 
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The primary objective of this study is to investigate whether the neutrality theorem is 
supported in a laboratory environment. More specifically, we compare two transfer mechanisms 
and two levels of endowment asymmetry in order to address the following research questions: (1) 
Are in-kind and income transfers equally effective in promoting adequate provision of a 
weakest-link IPG, and thus increasing the welfare of the rich as well as of the poor? (2) Does the 
degree of endowment asymmetry between donors and recipients play any role in determining the 
efficacy of these two transfer mechanisms? We believe these questions have tremendous 
implications on designing appropriate policy tools to improve both donors’ and recipients’ well-
beings.  
To answer these questions, we adopt a 2×2 design where the treatment variables are the 
foreign aid scheme and the endowment difference. The two aid schemes are income and in-kind 
transfers. There are two endowment conditions that capture the disparity in endowments between 
two paired individuals: weak asymmetry (WA) and strong asymmetry (SA). The game in our 
experiment is structured as a two-stage two-country game. In the first stage, agents 
simultaneously decide the fraction of their endowment which they would like to transfer to their 
counterpart. The aid is either an income or in-kind transfer. In stage two, agents simultaneously 
decide the allocation of their post-transfer wealth between their personal consumption and 
contribution to the public good in their own country. The level of the IPG is determined by the 
smaller of the total contributions between the two public goods. The parameters of endowments 
and payoff functions are carefully chosen so that unique Pareto (sub-game) perfect equilibrium 
payoffs exist in all four treatments (in-kind/WA, income/WA, in-kind/SA, and income/SA), and 
that the neutrality theorem is satisfied in this unique equilibrium. Furthermore, the equilibrium 
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payoffs are identical under both SA and WA endowment conditions. Based on our theoretical 
predications, we propose the following hypotheses for evaluation: 
 
Hypothesis 1: For either level of endowment asymmetry, both poor and rich 
countries are indifferent between the outcomes with in-kind transfers and the 
outcomes with income transfers. 
 
Hypothesis 2: For either type of transfer scheme, both poor and rich countries are 
indifferent between the outcomes under weakly asymmetric endowment condition 
and the outcomes under strongly asymmetric endowment condition. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The outcomes of all treatments are identical to those predicted by 
the Pareto perfect equilibrium solution. 
 
Following the above investigation, a question that is of interest is, if one aid mechanism 
proves to be more effective than the other when offered exclusively, will this same mechanism 
be the chosen one when both schemes are available simultaneously. We have two additional 
treatments (both/WA and both/SA) to examine this particular issue. 
As reported in detail in Sections 4 and 5, the weakest-link IPG is generally under 
provided in our experiment. The under provision problem is not unusual in the experimental 
literature on weakest-link games.3 What is of particular interest in our results is that none of the 
hypotheses is supported by our data. The neutrality theorem is refuted. Income and in-kind 
transfers appear to possess distinct efficacies under different endowment environments. Under 
                                                 
3 See Camerer (2003) for a survey on weakest-link games. 
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SA, in-kind transfers tend to generate a higher provision of the IPG and thus induce larger global 
welfare than income transfers. In contrast, income transfers are more effective than in-kind 
transfers under WA. Finally, when both types of foreign aid are available simultaneously, we 
find that, although it is not always in rich countries’ best interests to do so, in-kind transfers are 
their predominant choice regardless of the endowment environment. 
Due to the limited field data which can be used directly to test the neutrality theorem, we 
believe that experimental methods are a more useful tool to tackle the issues we intend to study 
here. Nevertheless, just like many other experimental laboratory studies, we are vulnerable to 
criticisms of oversimplification. Therefore, acknowledging the fact that our design does not 
capture the complexities of international politics, readers should note that the main objective of 
this study is to test a mathematically defined theory, regardless of the context. 
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is presented in 
Section 2. Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures. The results are reported 
in Sections 4 and 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
For simplicity, assume that there exist only two countries that share the same utility 
function but differ in their endowments. The poor country (P) has endowed wealth wwP β= , 
and the rich country (R) has endowed wealth wwR )1( β−= , where 0>w  and [ )2/1 ,0∈β . The 
utility function takes the following Cobb-Douglas form: 
 ααGAcu ii −= 1 , (1) 
where ic  is personal consumption, G is an international public good (IPG), 0>A , and )1 ,0(∈α .  
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In a conventional weakest-link public good game, the provision of the public good is 
determined by the lowest individual contribution (Hirshleifer, 1983). Therefore, the objective of 
country i is to maximize its utility function, subject to the budget constraint iii gcw +=  as well 
as the weakest-link aggregation technology } ,min{ PR ggG = , where ig  denotes country i’s 
contribution to the public good. It follows from the Cobb-Douglas utility function that country 
i’s best response to country j’s contribution, jg , is to contribute: 
 } ,min{)( ijji wggg α= . (2) 
Although each country contributes at most iwα , the maximal contribution that satisfies equation 
(2) for both countries is, in fact, constrained by wwP αβα = . In addition, since equation (2) also 
holds for any contribution smaller than wαβ , this game has multiple equilibria. These multiple 
equilbria are given by ** Gwc ii −= , where *** Ggg RP ==  and ] ,0[* wG αβ∈ . That is, when 
the aggregation technology takes the form of weakest-link, equilibrium is characterized by a 
matching behavior between the two countries in the sense that the provision of the public good in 
one country is the same as that in the other. Note that the equilibrium in which wG αβ=* , 
wcP βα )1(* −= , and wcR )1(* βαβ −−=  Pareto dominates all other equilibria. In other words, 
the level of the IPG at this Pareto dominant equilibrium is determined solely by the endowment 
of the poor country. This would change once international transfers are allowed. 
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2.1 Two-Stage Weakest-Link IPG with Income Transfers 
Consider the following two-stage game that has the same structure as in Vicary and 
Sandler (2002). During the first stage, countries are allowed to transfer their endowments to their 
counterparts. During the second stage, countries play the previously described weakest-link IPG 
game. Assuming that countries would never play a Pareto-dominated equilibrium in any sub-
game, we restrict our attention to Pareto (sub-game) perfect equilibria that are defined as the 
following: 
DEFINITION. A pair of strategies is a Pareto (sub-game) perfect equilibrium if the strategies, 
when confined to any sub-game of the original game, have the countries playing a Pareto 
dominant equilibrium within that sub-game. 
Let ] ,0[ ii ws ∈  denote an income transfer from country i to country j. Country i’s budget 
constraint becomes iiiji gcssw +=−+ , and its best response function in the second stage is: 
 )}( ,min{)( ijijji sswggg −+= α . (3) 
The Pareto-dominant equilibrium of the second stage is once again given by the wealth of the 
country that is poorer at the beginning of this post-transfer stage. Also note that the poorer 
country’s utility increases with its wealth. As a result, the rich country in the Pareto perfect 
equilibrium would never want to transfer a fraction of its wealth large enough so that it becomes 
the poorer of the two at the beginning of the second stage. By the same token, the poor country 
would never want to transfer anything to its rich counterpart. The level of the IPG in this case is 
then given by )( RP swG += α . So, by backward induction, the problem that the rich country 
has to solve in the first stage is to choose an amount of foreign aid Rs  which maximizes its own 
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utility Ru  given the budget constraint Gcsw RRR +=− . The solution yields a unique Pareto 
perfect equilibrium, in which the equilibrium path strategies are 
 =},,,{ **** RPRP ccss  ,0{ ,0  ,)1( wβα−  },)1( wαββ −−  if ,0ββ >  (4a) 
  ,0{ ,)( 0 wββ −  ,)1( 0wβα−  },)1( 00 wαββ −−  if ,0ββ ≤  (4b) 
where )1(0 ααβ += . Equation (4a) implies that the rich country would not benefit from 
providing any income transfers if the difference between two countries’ endowments is relatively 
small. On the contrary, if two countries are more asymmetric from each other as indicated by 
equation (4b), both countries would benefit from an income transfer from the rich to the poor. 
The post-transfer wealth of the poor and the rich are w0β  and w)1( 0β− , respectively. Therefore, 
as long as the condition of (4b) holds—meaning the poor country’s endowment is less than 
w0β —the level of the IPG and personal consumptions are always given by: 
 ,)1(   and   ,)1(   , 00
*
0
*
0
* wcwcwG RP αβββααβ −−=−==  (5)  
regardless of how much further the asymmetry is between the two countries.  
 
2.2 Two-Stage Weakest-Link IPG with In-Kind Transfers 
Consider a two-stage game similar to that in section 2.1, but with transfers directly 
contributed to the public good in the recipient country. Let ih  denote country i’s in-kind transfer 
to country j’s public good. Country i’s budget constraint becomes iiii hgcw ++= , and the IPG 
provision is determined by } ,min{ RPPR hghgG ++= . Note that for country i, the optimal 
contribution to its own public good is jijiji hhhwgh −−++ )}( ,min{ α  if this difference is 
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positive, or zero otherwise. In other words, country i’s best response function in the second stage 
is given by: 
 { }})( ,min{ ,0max)( jijijjiji hhhwhghgg −−+−+= α . (6)  
Since the poor country would not benefit from transferring any of its endowment to the rich 
country, .0=Ph It follows from equation (6) that, in a Pareto perfect equilibrium, 
)}( ,max{ RPR hwhG += α .  
We must now calculate the optimal in-kind transfer by the rich country.  In the first stage, 
the rich country chooses Rh  which maximizes Ru  given the budget constraint 
Gchw RRR +=− . The solution renders a unique Pareto perfect equilibrium with the 
equilibrium-path strategies: 
 =},,,{ **** RPRP cchh  ,0{ ,0  ,)1( wβα−  },)1( wαββ −−  if ,1ββ >  (7a) 
  ,0{ ,)( 0 wββ −  ,)1( 0wβα−  },)1( 00 wαββ −−  if ],,( 12 βββ ∈  (7b) 
  ,0{ ,2)1( wβα −  ,wβ  },)1)(1( wβα −−  if 2ββ ≤  (7c) 
It can be shown that there exists 25857.0≈θ such that 012 )]1(2[1 ββααβ α =<+−=  
if θα > . Equation (7a), which is identical to equation (4a), implies that when the poor country’s 
endowment is very close to the rich country’s, in-kind transfers are not beneficial for the rich, 
and thus the level of the IPG depends only on the poor country’s endowment. On the other hand, 
when the poor country’s endowment is much smaller than that of the rich, equation (7c) implies 
that only the rich country would contribute to the public goods, domestic and abroad. Therefore, 
it is the rich country’s endowment that determines the provision of the IPG. Finally, equation (7b) 
indicates that when the asymmetry is rather moderate, it is in both countries’ best interest to 
share the burden of the public good provision in the poor country.  
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It is worth emphasizing that, when θα >  and ],,( 02 βββ ∈  the provision of the IPG and 
the levels of private consumptions are exactly the same as those given in equation (5). In other 
words, when θα >  and ],,( 02 βββ ∈  a two-stage IPG game with either income or in-kind 
transfers would yield the same equilibrium outcome.  
 
3. The Experiment 
The experiment consisted of seven sessions to study the neutrality theorem or the 
effectiveness of two different types of foreign aid. All sessions were conducted at the University 
of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, between March 2004 and March 2005. A total of 140 
subjects were recruited from economics and mathematics introductory undergraduate courses. 
Some of the subjects may have participated in previous economics experiments, but none had 
any experience in the voluntary contribution mechanism and no subject participated in more than 
one session of the study. On average, a session lasted 120 minutes including initial instruction 
period and payment of subjects. The conversion rate differed between some sessions, but was 
always identical for all subjects within a given session. 4   Subjects earned an average of 
NZ$20.42.5 The experiment was computerized and used the Ztree software package (Fischbacher, 
1999), which was developed at the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics at the 
University of Zurich.   
Our core 2×2 design consisted of four treatments in which the treatment variables were 
aid scheme and endowment disparity. The two aid schemes were in-kind and income transfers. 
Aid transfers were considered as unconditional gifts.  In other words, aid donors were not 
allowed to impose any conditions as to how aid recipients should respond to their assistance.  
                                                 
4 The conversion rates ranged from 35 – 45 francs per New Zealand dollar. 
5 The adult minimum wage in New Zealand is $9.00NZ per hour. 
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Furthermore, income transfers were fungible in the sense that aid received by the recipients can 
be allocated to either their personal consumption or public good in any way that they see fit. 
There were two endowment disparity conditions in which the two aid mechanisms were being 
tested: weak asymmetry (WA) and strong asymmetry (SA). The total endowment of each two-
person group always summed to 10 francs, but the individual endowments depended upon the 
treatment and subject type.6  Under WA, the rich were endowed with 6.25 francs and the poor 
were endowed with 3.75 francs. Under SA, the rich and the poor were endowed with 8.25 and 
1.75 respectively.  Table 1 provides the number of subjects participated in each of the four 
treatments: in-kind/WA, income/WA, in-kind/SA, and income/SA.7   
 
[Table 1: About Here] 
 
Using a repeated play, partners matching protocol, the participants were separated into 
two-person groups that remained constant for the entire session.8 Within each group, subjects 
were assigned a specific type, i.e. rich country or poor country. 9  The computer terminals 
corresponding to particular groups and types were randomly distributed throughout the 
laboratory, and subjects were assigned to a group and type by their choice of terminal upon 
arrival for participation. Each participant was assigned an ID number and all interaction between 
group members took place through the computer terminal.  Thus, all individual decisions 
remained anonymous.  
                                                 
6 Francs were the currency used in the experiment. 
7 The number of participants in each session varied due to some recruited subjects not showing up for participation. 
8 As a robustness test for strategic behavior, we also conducted two sessions (in-kind vs. income transfers under SA) 
employing a stranger matching protocol in which the subjects were re-matched each period into new groups of two.  
We found that the results from these two sessions are consistent with those of the partner matching protocol.  The 
data are not reported in the paper, but available upon request. 
9 Each subject in a two-person group represents a country in the theoretical model.  To avoid framing effects in the 
experiment, we adopted the terms Type A and Type B for rich and poor countries respectively. 
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Each session consisted of 30 periods.10 The total number of periods in a session was 
made common knowledge to the subjects as well as the fact that the rules of the game were 
identical for each period. At the beginning of each session, the experiment instructions were read 
aloud for the subjects, who followed along with their own copy of the instruction. The subjects 
were encouraged to ask questions relating to the rules and interface at any time.11  
The procedures differ slightly between the two types of foreign aid. The income transfer 
mechanism consisted of a two-stage game. In the first stage, subjects had the opportunity to 
allocate some or all of their endowment to their counterpart group member. These decisions were 
made simultaneously by subjects clicking on the button that indicated the amount they wanted to 
transfer.12 Once all transfer decisions were made, the program progressed to the second stage. At 
the beginning of this stage, subjects were made aware of the amount of cash they had on hand, 
which consisted of their initial endowment minus their transfer to their group counterpart plus 
their counterpart’s transfer to them. They had to simultaneously decide how much of this cash on 
hand to contribute only to their own public good and the remaining fraction is allocated to their 
personal consumption. Their decision was made by clicking on the button representing the 
integer amount that they wanted to contribute to their public good. The remaining fraction was 
automatically allocated to their personal consumption. In order to finalize their decisions for the 
period, subjects must click a DONE button. Subjects could change their decisions as many times 
as they like prior to hitting the DONE button. 
                                                 
10 The subjects participated in an initial practice period, 0, to familiarize themselves with the software and specific 
parameters of the experiment.  The practice period did not count towards their earnings.   
11 Questions were asked privately to the experimenter in order to ensure that other subjects were not biased by 
potential normative statements/questions.  If the question was beneficial to the group as a whole, the experimenter 
repeated the question and answer to the group.  
12 Cash transfers were restricted to integers. 
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The in-kind transfer mechanism was very much like the income transfer, except that in 
the first stage, subjects transferred their endowment directly to their counterpart’s public good.13 
In the second stage, each subject was made aware of the contribution decisions of their 
counterpart to their own public good. They must then decide how much of the remaining portion 
of their endowment to contribute to their own public good and personal consumption 
respectively. 
At the end of each period in all treatments, the computer displayed a summary screen of 
the decisions and earnings of both group members. In the treatments with income transfers, this 
consisted of both group members’ transfer of endowment, contribution to their own public good, 
allocation to their own personal consumption and both group members’ period earnings. In the 
treatments with in-kind transfers, the summary information consisted of both group members’ 
contribution to each group project, sum of contributions to each project, their own allocation to 
personal consumption and both group members’ period earnings.   
The final two treatments, both/WA and both/SA, allowed for either an in-kind or income 
transfer in the first stage of the game by the same rules as in the treatments when each of them 
was offered exclusively. All other facets of these two treatments were exactly the same as the 
previous ones. The numbers of subjects participated in both/WA and both/SA are also given in 
Table 1.   
For all treatments, subjects’ payoff function was a discrete approximation of equation (1) 
with parameters A = 10 and 3/2=α . The payoff matrices for the rich and the poor are given in 
Table 2. 
 
                                                 
13 We imposed the same restriction as in Vicary and Sandler (2002) that subjects may contribute only up to half of 
their endowment to their counterpart’s public good.  This simply reduced the number of possible equilibria by 
eliminating half of the payoff matrix, but the optimal strategies were unaffected. 
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[Table 2: About Here] 
 
In section 2, we show that the Pareto perfect equilibrium of each of the two-stage games 
is unique. In addition, if θα >  and ],,( 02 βββ ∈  these two-stage games have the same set of 
equilibrium payoffs. Since the parameters used in our experiment under both WA and SA 
satisfied these conditions, in equilibrium 25* =Pu  and 27* =Ru , and the equilibrium path 
strategies were },,,{ **** RPRP ccss = },,,{
****
RPRP cchh = {0, 1, 1.75, 2.25} and {0, 3, 1.75, 2.25}, 
respectively.  In other words, the optimal strategy required the rich country to transfer 1 unit of 
its endowment to the poor under WA, but 3 units under SA. The equilibrium level of IPG was 
always equal to 3. Finally, because these payoffs, net transfers and contribution levels were 
unique, they were also unique at the Pareto perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games.  
The results from our core 2×2 design are discussed in the following section. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Net Transfers 
The time series of the average net transfers from the rich to the poor under WA and SA 
are shown in Figure 1. The entire stacked column in each period represents the average gross 
transfers from the rich to the poor, and the white portion of it represents the average transfers 
from the poor to the rich. Hence, the black portion of each column illustrates the average net 
transfers from the rich to the poor. The first impression is that, regardless of the treatment of 
foreign aid, the average amount of net transfers in the first ten periods under either WA or SA 
was generally far away from the optimal level. This is particularly true under SA. It appears as 
though the subjects required a few periods to familiarize themselves with the complex decision 
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environment. Nonetheless, from Figures 1(a) and 1(b), it is clear that average net transfers 
toward the end of the experiment under WA were extremely close to the equilibrium level. As 
for SA, Figures 1(c) and 1(d) indicate that net transfers eventually converged to the equilibrium 
only in the case of income transfers. Generally speaking, rich countries did not seem to transfer 
enough to their counterparts under SA.  
 
[Figure 1: About Here] 
 
Since we are more interested in equilibrium predictions and equilibrium behavior, we 
employ the data only from periods 11 to 30 in our data analysis throughout the rest of the paper. 
The statistical summary of several key variables from period 11 to period 30 is given in Table 3. 
Results 1 and 2 in the following summarize the impact of the various treatments of foreign aid on 
the amount of net transfers under WA and SA, respectively. 
 
[Table 3: About Here] 
 
RESULT 1: On average, net transfers from the rich to the poor under WA are not 
significantly different from the Pareto perfect equilibrium level. Furthermore, the amount of 
foreign aid with in-kind transfers does not differ significantly from that with income transfers. 
 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 1: The average amount of in-kind transfers from the rich to the 
poor is 1.355. The analogous number from to poor to the rich is 0.420. With income transfers, 
the average amount of transfers is 1.542 from the rich to the poor and 0.647 from the poor to the 
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rich. In sum, net transfers from periods 11 to 30, as indicated in Table 3, are on average 0.935 
with in-kind transfers, and 0.894 with income transfers. Without the assumption of normal 
distribution, we adopt a sign test that is distribution-free to see if the median of net transfers 
under each of these two aid treatments is significantly different from the equilibrium level. 
Taking each pair as one independent observation, neither medians under the two foreign aid 
treatments is significantly different from 1 at the 5% level (p-value = 0.5078 and 1.0000 for in-
kind and income transfers, respectively).  
To see if the amount of foreign aid is different with the foreign aid treatments, we adopt 
the following panel data approach which allows us to take advantage of the cross-sectional and 
time-series variation in the data: 
 itit uDtNT +++= 210 βββ ,  (8) 
where itNT  is group i’s net transfers from the rich to the poor in period t, D  is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 for the in-kind treatment and 0 otherwise. The feasible GLS estimates are provided 
in Table 4. As shown in the second column of Table 4, the estimate of 2β  is not significantly 
different from zero, implying that the amount of net transfers with in-kind giving is not 
significantly different from that with income transfers. ■ 
 
[Table 4: About Here] 
 
RESULT 2: Under SA, rich countries transfer significantly less than the optimal amount 
to their poor counterparts. The amount of foreign aid with in-kind transfers does not differ 
significantly from that with income transfers. 
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SUPPORT FOR RESULT 2: The average amount of in-kind transfers from the rich to the 
poor is 2.727. The analogous number from to poor to the rich is 0. With income transfers, the 
average amount of transfers is 2.995 from the rich to the poor and 0.177 from the poor to the rich. 
In sum, net transfers between period 11 and period 30, as shown in Table 3, are on average 2.727 
under in-kind, and 2.818 under income. Taking each pair as one independent observation, one-
sided sign tests show that the medians of net transfers under both treatments are significantly less 
than 3 at least at the 10% level (p-value = 0.0156 and 0.0625 for in-kind and income transfers, 
respectively). The feasible GLS estimates for SA are shown in the third column of Table 4. The 
estimate of 2β  is not significantly different from zero. In other words, net transfers are not 
significantly different between the two foreign aid treatments. ■ 
 
4.2 Provision of the IPG 
Figure 2 presents the times series of the average level of the IPG from periods 1 to 30. 
Regardless of the aid treatment, Figure 2(a) shows that the IPG was constantly under provided 
under WA. This pattern persisted even to the last few periods of the experiment when foreign aid 
was on average at its optimal level.  
 
[Figure 2: About Here] 
 
RESULT 3: The IPG is under provided under WA. Nonetheless, the provision of the IPG 
is significantly higher with income transfers than with in-kind transfers. 
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SUPPORT FOR RESULT 3: From periods 11 to 30, the average level of the IPG is 2.200 
under in-kind, and 2.419 under income. Taking each pair as one independent observation, one-
sided sign tests show that both medians of the IPG provisions are significantly less than 3 (p-
value = 0.0020 and 0.0000 for in-kind and income transfers, respectively).  
The following panel-data regression model is used to investigate the influence of 
different aid treatments on the provision of the IPG, provided that the amount of foreign aid is 
controlled for: 
 itititit uNTNTDtG +++++= 243210 βββββ ,     (9)              
where itG  is group i’s provision level of the IPG in period t. D and NT are defined as in equation 
(8). The feasible GLS estimates are provided in the second column of Table 5. The estimate of 
2β  being −0.322 implies that, after the amount of net transfers is controlled for, the IPG level 
under the in-kind transfer treatment is 0.322 units lower than that under the income transfer 
treatment each period, and this difference is statistically significant. 581.0ˆ3 =β  and 188.0ˆ4 −=β  
imply that net transfers increase the level of the IPG at a decreasing rate. ■ 
 
[Table 5: About Here] 
 
The under provision problem of the IPG is by no means a phenomenon that would occur 
only under WA. Figure 2(b) indicates that IPG was under provided under SA throughout the 
entire thirty periods, although the problem was perhaps less severe with in-kind transfers. 
 
RESULT 4: The IPG is under provided under SA. The provision of the IPG is significantly 
higher with in-kind transfers than with income transfers. 
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SUPPORT FOR RESULT 4: The average level of the IPG from period 11 to period 30 is 
2.768 under the in-kind treatment, and 2.455 under income. As in WA, results from one-sided 
sign tests suggest that the medians of the IPG with both in-kind and income transfers are 
significantly less than 3 (p-value = 0.0078 and 0.0039 for in-kind and income transfers, 
respectively). Although the IPG is underprovided under both foreign aid treatments, the feasible 
GLS estimates of equation (10), shown in the third column of Table 5, suggest that the level of 
the IPG under in-kind is significantly higher than that under income. More specifically, the 
increment is about 0.310 units per period with in-kind transfers. ■ 
 
The result that the IPG is under provided even when foreign aid is at its optimal level 
should not surprise readers. It is consistent with, for example, Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) 
who find that a public good of the weakest-link type is under provided when the contribution 
decisions are made simultaneously. In addition, previous studies have found that, with non-linear 
payoff functions such as the Cobb-Douglas utility function we adopted here, contributions to 
public goods tend to be below the Nash equilibrium prediction (Andreoni, 1993; Chan et al., 
2002; and Cason et al., 2004). The importance of our findings, however, is that neutrality 
theorem is not supported by our data. The relative efficacy between in-kind and income transfers 
varies under different endowment conditions. Income transfers are more effective to advance the 
level of the IPG when the donor and the recipient are less asymmetric. In-kind transfers, on the 
contrary, appear to exhibit greater efficacy under the condition of strong asymmetry. 
To search for an explanation to this observation, we divide the deviation of the IPG from 
its Pareto perfect equilibrium level into three components. The first component, defined as total 
 20
investment into the two IPG projects minus (2×IPG), captures some degree of the coordination 
failure between the donor and the recipient. In the case where there is no coordination failure, 
total investment in the Pareto perfect equilibrium should be 6 units of the aggregate endowment, 
equally divided between two countries. Suppose, for example, there are 3 units of the aggregate 
endowment being allocated to the rich country’s public good, and 2 units to the poor country’s. 
The provision level of the IPG in this case is min{3, 2} = 2, and thus 1 unit of the resources 
( 12223 =×−+ ) is wasted because of the coordination failure. For this reason, we call the first 
component “waste”. The second and the third components concern the deviation of each 
country’s consumption from its optimal level: the rich country’s consumption deviation is 
defined as 25.2−Rc , and the poor country’s consumption deviation is defined as 75.1−Pc . 
Note that the sum of these three components is: 
waste ( 2.25) ( 1.75) total investment 2 IPG 4
10 2 IPG 4
6 2 IPG
2 (3 IPG)
2 IPG Dev.
R P R Pc c c c+ − + − = − × + + −
= − × −
= − ×
= × −
= ×
 
 
RESULT 5: Income transfers have an exceptionally strong advantage of reducing 
coordination failure under WA. In-kind transfers can help reduce over-consumption, particularly 
on the part of poor countries under SA. 
  
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 5: The regression analysis of equation (9) is conducted—with the 
dependent variable being substituted by waste, deviation of Rc , or deviation of Pc —to see how 
different foreign aid treatments affect factors that constitute the departure of the IPG from the 
Pareto perfect equilibrium. The feasible GLS estimates are summarized in Table 6. 
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[Table 6: About Here] 
 
Under WA, the amount of wasted resource with in-kind transfers is higher than that with 
income transfers by a significant amount of 0.323 per period, which suggests that income 
transfers are more effective in reducing coordination failure than in-kind transfers under WA. 
The departure of rich countries’ consumption from the optimum is 0.220 higher under the in-
kind transfer treatment than under the income transfer treatment. The analogous number for the 
deviation of poor countries’ consumption is 0.101. Although income transfers also help reduce 
the departure of consumption on the part of the rich as well as the poor, the strength does not 
appear to be as strong as its influence on lessening coordination inefficiency. 
Table 6 shows that the advantage of income transfers to reduce coordination failure 
completely disappears under SA. On the other hand, the consumption deviation of the rich and of 
the poor is 0.235 and 0.329 lower under the in-kind than under the income transfer treatment. 
Both are significant at the 5% level. ■ 
 
4.3 Welfare 
Figure 3 shows the time series of the average utility of the rich, the poor, and also the 
global welfare under WA. It is obvious that both the rich and the poor reached higher utilities 
with income transfers after the first few periods of learning. The same time series for SA is 
presented in Figure 4. Under SA, it is in-kind transfers that made both parties better off. Also 
notice that the welfare of the rich from period 17 to period 30 under the in-kind transfer 
treatment was around 26, implying only 3.7% of the efficiency loss for rich countries. 
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[Figures 3 and 4: About Here] 
 
In the following regression analysis, we define the welfare efficiency as the realized 
period payoff divided by the payoff at the Pareto perfect equilibrium. Results are summarized as 
the follows. 
 
RESULT 6: Income transfers generate greater welfare for both the rich and the poor than 
in-kind transfers under WA.  As a result, global welfare is higher with income transfers when the 
disparity in country size is relatively small.  
 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 6: The feasible GLS estimates of equation (9)—the dependent 
variable is replaced with welfare efficiency—are given in Table 7. After we take the amount of 
foreign aid into consideration, in-kind transfers significantly reduce the welfare of the rich by 
7.8% and the welfare of the poor by 9.6% from the income transfer treatment. On average, the 
difference, which is statistically significant, in the global welfare efficiency between these two 
aid schemes is 8.7% per period. ■   
 
[Table 7: About Here] 
 
RESULT 7: Under SA, in-kind transfers generate higher utilities for the rich and the poor 
than income transfers. The global welfare with in-kind transfers is thus higher than that with 
income transfers.  
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SUPPORT FOR RESULT 7: Table 7 also documents the feasible GLS estimates for SA. 
Given the amount of foreign aid, the welfare efficiencies of the rich and of the poor are 6.3% and 
4.6% higher with in-kind transfers than with income transfers. Consequently, the global welfare 
is approximately 5.5% higher with in-kind transfers. All three estimates are significant at the 5% 
level. ■   
 
The above results indicate that Hypotheses 1 and 3 are not supported by our data. In other 
words, for either WA or SA endowment environment, outcomes with in-kind transfers are 
different from those with income transfers. Furthermore, variables such as the provision of the 
IPG and welfare efficiencies are all below our theoretical predictions. Finally, Results 8 and 9 in 
the following show that our Hypothesis 2 is rejected as well.  
 
RESULT 8: Given either of the two foreign aid schemes, welfare of the rich under SA is 
significantly higher than that under WA. 
 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 8: The mean utilities of the rich under our core four treatments, as 
mentioned before, are shown in Table 3. A Mann-Whitney ranksum test of the two different 
endowment conditions provides a p-value of 0.0000 for in-kind and a p-value of 0.0140 for 
income transfers. Therefore, we can reject the hypothesis at the 5% level that the two 
distributions are the same given either type of the two transfer schemes. ■ 
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RESULT 9: Given in-kind transfers, welfare of the poor is significantly higher under SA 
than under WA. With income transfers, however, there is no significant difference in the poor 
countries’ welfare between the two endowment conditions.  
 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 9: Table 3 summarizes the mean utilities of the poor under 
different treatments. A Mann-Whitney ranksum test of the two different endowment conditions 
provides a p-value of 0.0000 for in-kind transfers and a p-value of 0.7375 for income transfers. 
Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are the same at the 5% level for in-
kind transfers but not for income transfers. ■ 
 
5. Choice between Two Transfer Schemes 
Our results discussed above have shown that neutrality theorem is refuted, and that in-
kind and income transfers are more effective in enhancing welfare under SA and WA 
environment, respectively. We obtained these results by predetermining the type of foreign aid 
that subjects could implement. In a given session, there was no alternative option available for 
them to decide which of the two schemes was in fact more effective.  If the subjects wanted to 
provide foreign aid to their counterpart, they were forced to employ the specific aid instrument 
that was given to them.  In our last two treatments (both/WA and both/SA), we relaxed this 
constraint and allowed subjects to freely choose between either in-kind or income transfers. The 
specific research questions addressed in this section are: (1) When both foreign aid allocation 
mechanisms are made available simultaneously, will the rich eventually choose the type that was 
shown to be more effective when either mechanism was offered exclusively, i.e. income transfers 
under WA environment but in-kind transfers under SA environment? (2) If not, is it actually in 
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rich countries’ best interest to choose otherwise? 14  The statistical summary of several key 
variables for the last twenty periods in both/WA and both/SA treatments is provided in Table 3.   
 
RESULT 10: When both income and in-kind transfers are available simultaneously under 
WA, the predominantly chosen aid scheme by the rich is in-kind transfer.15 
 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 10: Figure 5(a) provides the type of aid that was adopted by the 
rich country in each group under WA over time. In total, there were 67 income transfers vs. 212 
in-kind transfers from the rich to the poor for the entire course of the session.16  This pattern 
stays quite stable even for the last twenty periods, during which 42 income transfers vs. 143 in-
kind transfers were made by the rich. ■ 
 
[Figure 5(a): About Here] 
 
Obviously, majority of the rich preferred to give in-kind. One conjecture for this outcome 
is that in-kind transfers ensure the foreign aid to be allocated to the IPG provision. In other words, 
with in-kind transfers, donors have a full control over the use of the aid. However, it may also be 
the case that the in-kind transfers are simply a more effective mechanism when both schemes are 
available simultaneously. To see if this is indeed the case, the following regression model, 
similar to equation (9), is used for the data analysis:  
 ititititit uNTNTDDtY ++++++= 254231210 ββββββ ,     (10) 
                                                 
14 Note that, since subjects were not allowed to combine in-kind and income transfers in these two treatments, the 
game under both/WA and both/SA had only the two Pareto perfect equilibria described in Section 2. 
15 The predominantly chosen transfer mechanism by the poor is also in-kind transfer. In total, there were 34 income 
transfers and 128 in-kind transfers made by the poor throughout the entire thirty periods. 
16 There were a few periods in which some of the rich countries did not provide any foreign aid to their counterparts. 
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where itY  represents group i’s IPG provision or welfare efficiencies in period t. itD1  is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if an in-kind transfer is made in period t by the rich country in group i, and 
0 if an income transfer is made instead. 2D  is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the groups that 
exercised income transfers less than 10% of their total plays (three times).17  The rationale 
behind adding this new dummy variable is that efficiency loss is presumably less severe when a 
group concentrates on learning and utilizing only one aid instrument. Therefore, we believe it is 
necessary to control for this particular effect in order to avoid a bias in the estimate of the impact 
of different aid schemes.  
 
RESULT 11: When both income and in-kind transfers are available simultaneously under 
WA, the use of in-kind transfers as the predominant foreign aid scheme provides a lower 
provision of the IPG and lower overall welfare than if income transfers are used.  
 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 11: We employ the data only from periods 11 to 30 in our 
regression analysis. The feasible GLS estimates under WA are provided in Table 8. The results 
are essentially the same as those when each of the two foreign aid schemes is offered exclusively 
under WA. The provision level of the IPG and the individual welfare efficiencies are 
significantly lower with in-kind transfers. As a consequence, the global welfare is significantly 
lower by approximately 6% per period when in-kind transfers are used by the rich. ■ 
 
[Table 8: About Here] 
 
                                                 
17 They are group #1, #5, #6, and #9 under WA, and group #1, #2, #3, #6, #7, and #10 under SA.   
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 These results clearly suggest that most of the rich countries in our experiment did not 
choose the “right” tool to build up the provision of the IPG and to enhance welfare efficiencies. 
Being able to command the use of the foreign aid appears to dominate rich countries’ decisions 
under WA. 
 
RESULT 12: When both income and in-kind transfers are available simultaneously under 
SA, the predominantly chosen aid scheme by the rich is in-kind transfer.  
 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 12: Figure 5(b) provides the type of aid that was adopted by the 
rich country in each group under SA. Over the entire thirty periods of the experiment, the rich 
made a total of 264 in-kind transfers and 34 income transfers. Out of those 34 income transfers, 
25 of them were made during the first ten periods. During the last ten periods, foreign aid was 
made entirely via in-kind transfers. ■  
 
[Figure 5(b): About Here] 
 
Apparently, rich countries under SA also preferred in-kind giving than income transfers. 
But this particular aid scheme is indeed the right choice for them to make: the provision of the 
IPG and the welfare efficiencies are all higher with in-kind transfers. This observation is stated 
as the following result. 
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RESULT 13: When both income and in-kind transfers are available simultaneously under 
SA, the use of in-kind transfers as the predominant foreign aid scheme provides a higher 
provision of the IPG and higher overall level of welfare than if income transfers are used.  
 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 13:  The feasible GLS estimates under SA are also summarized in 
Table 8. The IPG provision is about 0.459 unit higher if an in-kind transfer is used in a given 
period. Both individual utilities are significantly higher with in-kind transfers. As a consequence, 
the global welfare is significantly higher by approximately 9% per period when in-kind transfers 
are used by the rich. ■ 
      
6. Conclusion 
 
 The level of foreign aid transferred between countries to finance international public 
goods has been steadily increasing over the last few decades both in terms of in-kind and income 
transfers. An interesting question with important policy implications is whether it matters which 
of these transfer mechanisms is implemented? In this study, we investigate whether in-kind and 
income transfers are equally effective in providing a weakest-link IPG, and if disparity in 
country size between donors and recipients plays a role in the effectiveness of either mechanism. 
We find that it certainly does matter, and that the relative efficacy of the transfer mechanisms 
varies with differences in the relative country size. More specifically, income transfers provide a 
higher level of the IPG and thus higher overall welfare level when the difference in country size 
is relatively small. On the other hand, when there is a large disparity in country size, in-kind 
transfers tend to generate a higher provision level of the IPG and higher accompanying global 
welfare. In sum, the neutrality theorem is refuted by our data. 
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Why does it appear that income transfers perform better than in-kind transfers only in the 
situation where two countries are weakly asymmetric?  Our results show that, under WA, income 
transfers could help reduce the amount of resources wasted due to coordination failure or 
mismatching behavior between the donor and the recipient. But, under SA, because the poor are 
so poor that their public goods need to be funded entirely by their rich counterparts, mismatching 
behavior is less likely to occur under such an endowment environment. Therefore, the advantage 
of income transfers that exists when countries are more alike completely vanishes once they are 
implemented under SA. Adding to the inefficiency of income transfers is that aid recipients have 
a tendency to consume a portion of the aid money that is intended to fund their public goods. The 
fungible nature of income transfers appears to have a particularly devastating effect on the public 
good provision when there are sharp differences between country sizes.   
In addition to investigate the neutrality theorem, we also examine rich countries’ 
preferences between in-kind and income transfers once both transfer schemes are made available 
for them to implement. We find that, regardless of the endowment condition, rich countries have 
a strong tendency to choose in-kind over income transfers even though it is not always in their 
interest to do so. This is particularly true when the donor’s and the recipient’s sizes are only 
weakly asymmetric. Being able to directly control the use of the foreign aid might have played 
some role in the rich countries’ decision-making. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Treatments and Number of Subjects 
 
Endowment Disparity 
 
Weak Asymmetry 
(6.25 vs. 3.75) 
Strong Asymmetry 
(8.25 vs. 1.75) 
In-kind Transfers 20  22 
Income Transfers 36 22 Type of Aid 
Both Options 
Available 
20 20 
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Table 2a: Payoff Matrix for the Rich 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2b: Payoff Matrix for the Poor 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rc  
 
0.25 1.25 2.25 3.25 4.25 5.25 6.25 7.25 8.25 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 6 10 13 14 16 17 18 19  
2 10 17 20 23 25 27    
3 13 22 27 30      
G 
4 15 27        
Pc  
 
0.75 1.75 2.75 3.75 4.75 5.75 6.75 7.75 8.75 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 9 12 14 15 16 17 18 19  
2 14 19 22 24 26 28    
3 18 25 29 32      
G 
4 22 30        
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Table 3: Statistical Summary of Key Variables from Periods 11 to 30  
WA 
(6.25 vs. 3.75) 
SA 
(8.25 vs. 1.75) 
  In-kind 
Transfers 
 
Income 
Transfers 
Both 
Options 
Available
In-kind 
Transfers 
Income 
Transfers 
Both 
Options 
Available 
Net 
Transfers 
0.935 
(0.751) 
0.894 
(1.029) 
0.905 
(0.677) 
2.727 
(0.647) 
2.818 
(0.784) 
2.920 
(0.405) 
G 2.200 (0.839) 
2.419 
(0.715) 
2.360 
(0.750) 
2.768 
(0.537) 
2.455 
(0.784) 
2.890 
(0.423) 
uR 
22.070 
(6.089) 
23.500 
(4.938) 
23.090 
(5.479) 
25.727 
(3.589) 
23.805 
(5.660) 
26.365 
(2.909) 
uP 
20.320 
(6.006) 
21.992 
(5.161) 
21.485 
(5.236) 
23.055 
(4.333) 
22.005 
(5.222) 
24.240 
(3.081) 
Obs. 
 
200 
 
360 200 220 220 200 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 4: The Feasible GLS Estimates of Net Transfers from the Rich to the Poor 
 WA 
(6.25 vs. 3.75) 
SA 
(8.25 vs. 1.75) 
Constant 0.828*** 
(0.087) 
2.693*** 
(0.078) 
Period 0.006 
(0.007) 
0.012*** 
(0.006) 
Dummy for In-Kind Treatment 0.041 
(0.083) 
−0.091 
(0.068) 
Number of Groups 28 
 
22 
Number of Observations 560 
 
440 
***: significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 5: The Feasible GLS Estimates of the IPG Level 
 WA 
(6.25 vs. 3.75) 
SA 
(8.25 vs. 1.75) 
Constant 2.178*** 
(0.065) 
0.022 
(0.136) 
Period 0.007 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
Dummy for In-Kind Treatment −0.322*** 
(0.057) 
0.310*** 
(0.048) 
Net Transfers  0.581*** 
(0.041) 
1.413*** 
(0.086) 
(Net Transfers)2 −0.188*** 
(0.014) 
−0.189*** 
(0.016) 
Number of Groups 28 
 
22 
Number of Observations 560 
 
440 
***: significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 6: Components of the Deviation of the IPG 
WA 
(6.25 vs. 3.75) 
SA 
(8.25 vs. 1.75) 
 
waste 
 
cR dev. 
 
cP dev. waste 
 
cR dev. 
 
cP dev. 
Constant 0.384*** 
(0.067) 
1.381*** 
(0.060) 
−0.120** 
(0.067)
2.703*** 
(0.161) 
3.378*** 
(0.155) 
−0.126 
(0.123)
Period −0.007 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
−0.007 
(0.005)
−0.006 
(0.005)
−0.004 
(0.005) 
−0.002 
(0.004)
Dummy for In-
Kind Treatment 
0.323*** 
(0.060) 
0.220*** 
(0.053) 
0.101** 
(0.059) 
−0.057 
(0.057)
−0.235*** 
(0.055) 
−0.329*** 
(0.044)
Net Transfers 
 
−0.245*** 
(0.042) 
−1.295*** 
(0.038)
0.376*** 
(0.042) 
−1.325*** 
(0.102)
−1.229*** 
(0.099) 
−0.273*** 
(0.078)
(Net Transfers)2 
 
0.135*** 
(0.015) 
0.141*** 
(0.014) 
0.101*** 
(0.015) 
0.169*** 
(0.019) 
0.064*** 
(0.018) 
0.144*** 
(0.014) 
Number of 
Groups 
28 28 28 22 22 22 
Number of 
Observations 
560 560 560 440 440 440 
***, **: significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 7: The Feasible GLS Estimates of Individual Welfare and Global Welfare 
WA 
(6.25 vs. 3.75) 
SA 
(8.25 vs. 1.75) 
 
Rich 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
Poor 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
Global 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
Rich 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
Poor 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
Global 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
Constant 0.876*** 
(0.017) 
0.763*** 
(0.016) 
0.822*** 
(0.016) 
0.396*** 
(0.040) 
0.119*** 
(0.035) 
0.263*** 
(0.036) 
Period 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Dummy for In-
Kind Treatment 
−0.078*** 
(0.015) 
−0.096*** 
(0.014)
−0.087*** 
(0.014)
0.063*** 
(0.014) 
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.055*** 
(0.013) 
Net Transfers 
 
0.071*** 
(0.011) 
0.220*** 
(0.010) 
0.143*** 
(0.010) 
0.336*** 
(0.025) 
0.410*** 
(0.022) 
0.372*** 
(0.023) 
(Net Transfers)2 
 
−0.052*** 
(0.004) 
−0.048*** 
(0.004)
−0.050*** 
(0.004)
−0.055*** 
(0.005)
−0.048*** 
(0.004) 
−0.052*** 
(0.004)
Number of 
Groups 
28 28 28 22 22 22 
Number of 
Observations 
560 560 560 440 440 440 
***: significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 8: The Feasible GLS Estimates When Both Foreign Aid Schemes Are Available Simultaneously  
 
WA 
(6.25 vs. 3.75) 
SA 
(8.25 vs. 1.75) 
 IPG 
Rich 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
Poor 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
Global 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
IPG 
Rich 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
Poor 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
Global 
Welfare 
Efficiency 
Constant 
 
2.041*** 
(0.136) 
0.830*** 
(0.028) 
0.749*** 
(0.030) 
0.791*** 
(0.027) 
−0.498 
(0.330) 
0.319*** 
(0.103) 
0.131 
(0.101) 
0.228*** 
(0.100) 
Period 
 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
−0.001 
(0.003) 
−0.00003 
(0.001) 
0.00001 
(0.001) 
−0.00001 
(0.001) 
Dummy for 
In-Kind Transfers 
−0.243*** 
(0.109) 
−0.050*** 
(0.022) 
−0.071*** 
(0.024) 
−0.060*** 
(0.022) 
0.459*** 
(0.105) 
0.085*** 
(0.033) 
0.101*** 
(0.032) 
0.093*** 
(0.032) 
Dummy for Not 
Using Different 
Aid Options  
0.356*** 
(0.097) 
0.081*** 
(0.020) 
0.093*** 
(0.022) 
0.087*** 
(0.019) 
−0.004 
(0.039) 
−0.004 
(0.012) 
−0.008 
(0.012) 
−0.006 
(0.012) 
Net Transfers 
 
1.127*** 
(0.173) 
0.242*** 
(0.035) 
0.263*** 
(0.038) 
0.252*** 
(0.034) 
1.540*** 
(0.321) 
0.389*** 
(0.100) 
0.329*** 
(0.099) 
0.360*** 
(0.097) 
(Net Transfers)2 −0.524*** 
(0.075) 
−0.147*** 
(0.015) 
−0.081*** 
(0.017) 
−0.115*** 
(0.015) 
−0.178*** 
(0.068) 
−0.064*** 
(0.021) 
−0.025 
(0.021) 
−0.045*** 
(0.020) 
Number of 
Observations 
 
185 185 185 185 199 199 199 199 
     ***: significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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    Figure 1: Time Series of the Average Net Transfers from the Rich to the Poor 
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Figure 2: Time Series of the Average IPG Level 
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Figure 3: Time Series of the Average Payoffs under WA 
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Figure 4: Time Series of the Average Payoffs under SA 
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Figure 5: Time Series of the Aid Chosen by the Rich 
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